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Abstract
Guidelines and principles of trustworthy AI should be adhered to in practice during the development of AI
systems. This work suggests a novel information theoretic trustworthy AI framework based on the hypoth-
esis that information theory enables taking into account the ethical AI principles during the development
of machine learning and deep learning models via providing a way to study and optimize the inherent
tradeoffs between trustworthy AI principles. A unified approach to “privacy-preserving interpretable and
transferable learning” is presented via introducing the information theoretic measures for privacy-leakage,
interpretability, and transferability. A technique based on variational optimization, employing conditionally
deep autoencoders, is developed for practically calculating the defined information theoretic measures for
privacy-leakage, interpretability, and transferability.
Keywords: Trustworthy AI, privacy, interpretability, transfer learning, information theory, machine and
deep learning.
1. Introduction
Trust in the development, deployment, and use of AI is essential to fully utilize the AI-potential in
contributing to human well being and society. The recent advances in machine and deep learning have
rejuvenated the field of AI with an enthusiasm that AI would become an integral part of human life.
However, rapid proliferation of AI will give rise to several ethical, legal, and social issues.
1.1. Trustworthy AI and Guidelines
In response to the ethical, legal, and social challenges accompanied by AI, guidelines and ethical princi-
ples have been established [6, 1, 2, 3] to evaluate the responsible development of AI systems that are good
for humanity and the environment. The guidelines have introduced the concept of trustworthy AI (TAI)
and the term TAI has quickly gained attention in research and practice. TAI is based on the idea that trust
in AI will make AI realize its full potential in contributing to societies, economies, and sustainable develop-
ment. As “trust” is a complex phenomenon being studied in diverse disciplines (i.e. psychology, sociology,
economics, management, computer science, and information systems), the definition and realization of TAI
remains challenging. While forming trust in technology, users express expectations about the technology’s
functionality, helpfulness and reliability [17]. The authors in [21] state that “AI is perceived as trustworthy
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by its users (e.g., consumers, organizations, society) when it is developed, deployed, and used in ways that
not only ensure its compliance with all relevant laws and its robustness but especially its adherence to general
ethical principles”.
Academicians, industries, and policymakers have developed in recent times for TAI several frameworks
and guidelines including “Asilomar AI Principles” [4], “Montreal Declaration of Responsible AI” [23], “UK
AI Code” [22], “AI4People” [3], “Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI” [6], “OECD Principles on AI” [19],
“Governance Principles for the New Generation Artificial Intelligence” [18], and “Guidance for Regulation
of Artificial Intelligence Applications” [24]. However, it was argued in [5] that AI ethics lack a reinforcement
mechanism and economic incentives could easily override commitment to ethical principles and values.
1.2. Principles of Ethical AI
The five principles of ethical AI [3] (i.e. beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy, justice, and explicability)
have been adopted for TAI [21]. Beneficence refers to promoting well-being of humans, preserving dignity,
and sustaining the planet. Non-maleficence refers to avoiding bringing harm to people and is especially
concerned with the protection of people’s privacy and security. Autonomy refers to the promotion of human
autonomy, agency, and oversight including the restriction of AI Systems’ autonomy, where necessary. Justice
refers to using AI for correcting past wrongs, ensuring shared benefits through AI; and preventing the creation
of new harms and inequities by AI. Explicability comprises an epistemological sense and an ethical sense.
Explicability refers in epistemological sense to the explainable AI via creating interpretable AI models with
high levels of performance and accuracy. In ethical sense, explicability refers to accountable AI. Despite the
importance of outlined TAI principles, their major limitation, as identified in [21], is concerning the fact
that principles are highly general and provide little to no guidance for how they can be transferred into
practice. To address this limitation, a data-driven research framework for TAI was outlined in [21].
1.3. Motivation of the Current Study
We identify in Table 1 the core issues related to machine learning and deep learning based AI systems
that need to be addressed for fulfilling the five principles of trustworthy AI. The solution approaches to
address the issues concerning TAI (as identified in Table 1) do exist in the literature, however, a unified
solution approach addressing all major issues doesn’t exist. Thus, the motivation of this study is derived
from the requirement of a TAI framework addressing the core issues in a rigorous analytical manner.
1.4. Proposed Framework for Trustworthy AI
We hypothesize that an information theoretic unified approach leads to the development of a framework
allowing transferring of TAI principles into practice. We propose a novel framework, referred to as Infor-
mation Theoretic Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence (ITTAI), for the design and analysis of trustworthy
AI systems. The ITTAI framework is based on the hypothesis that information theory enables taking into
account the trustworthy AI principles of beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy, justice, and explicability
during the development of machine learning and deep learning based AI systems via providing a way to
study and optimize the inherent tradeoffs between TAI principles. The overall aim of ITTAI framework is to
facilitate transfer of TAI principles into practice via fulfilling following aims:
Aim 1: To develop an information theoretic approach to privacy enabling the quantification of privacy
leakage in-terms of mutual information between sensitive private data and the released public data
without the availability of a prior knowledge about data statistics (such as joint distributions of public
and private variables).
Aim 2: To develop an information theoretic criterion for evaluating the interpretability of a machine learn-
ing model in-terms of mutual information between non-interpretable model outputs/activations and
corresponding interpretable parameters.
Aim 3: To develop an information theoretic criterion for evaluating the transferability (of a machine learn-
ing model from source to target domain) in-terms of mutual information between source domain model
outputs/activations and target domain model outputs/activations.
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Table 1: Core issues of TAI principles and solution approach
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Aim 4: To develop analytical approaches to machine and deep learning allowing quantification of model
uncertainties.
Aim 5: To develop a unified approach to “privacy-preserving interpretable and transferable learning” for
an analytical optimization of privacy-interpretability-transferability tradeoffs.
ITTAI framework (with its structure as in Fig. 1) addresses the
1. issues I1 and I2 of beneficence principle by means of transfer and federated learning;
2. issues I3 and I4 of non-maleficence principle by means of privacy-preserving data release mechanisms;
3. issue I5 of autonomy principle by means of analytical machine and deep learning algorithms enabling
the user to quantify model uncertainties and hence to decide the level of autonomy given to AI systems;
4. issue I6 of justice principle by means of federated learning;
5. issue I7 of explicability principle by means of interpretable machine and deep learning models.
The most important feature of ITTAI is that the notions of privacy, interpretability, and transferability
are quantified by means of information theoretic measures allowing the study and optimization of tradeoffs
between TAI principles (such as tradeoff between privacy and transferability, or tradeoff between privacy
and interpretability) in a practical manner.
1.5. Novelty and Contributions
This study presents a unified approach to “privacy-preserving interpretable and transferable learning”
under the proposed ITTAI framework. The study introduces the information theoretic measures for privacy-
leakage, interpretability, and transferability. It is possible to derive analytical expressions for the defined
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Figure 1: ITTAI framework facilitates a transfer of TAI principles (beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy, justice, and
explicability) into practice via providing an information theoretic unified approach to “privacy-preserving interpretable and
transferable learning” for studying the privacy-interpretability-transferability tradeoffs.
the data distributions are unknown and thus a way to approximate the defined measures is required. There-
fore, a novel method, that employs recently introduced conditionally deep autoencoders [10], is presented for
approximating the defined privacy-leakage, interpretability, and transferability measures. The method relies
on inferring a variational Bayesian inverse model that facilitates an analytical approximation of the informa-
tion theoretic measures through variational optimization methodology. Finally, a computational algorithm
is provided for practically calculating the privacy-leakage, interpretability, and transferability measures.
1.6. Contents and Organization
This text is organized into sections. The proposed methodology in this study relies heavily on the Breg-
man divergence based conditionally deep autoencoders for data representation learning. Therefore, section 2
has been dedicated to the review of conditionally deep autoencoders from [10]. Under the proposed ITTAI
framework, we adopt the transfer learning approach of [7] that combines conditionally deep autoencoder
with a tailored noise adding mechanism to achieve a given level of privacy-loss bound with the minimum
perturbation of the data. A review of the privacy-preserving transfer learning method is provided in sec-
tion 3. A further application of conditionally deep autoencoders to inverse problem is considered in section 4.
The reason being that a model related to the inverse problem is required, as discussed in section 5, for an
analytical approximation of an information theoretic measure referred to as information-leakage. Section 5
presents the most important result of this study regarding variational approximation of information-leakage
and development of a computational algorithm for calculating information-leakage. The significance of
information-leakage assessment is due to the fact that the measures (for privacy-leakage, interpretability,
and transferability), as defined in section 6, are in the form of information-leakages. The application of
proposed measures to study the tradeoffs between TAI principles is demonstrated through the experiments
made on the widely used MNIST digits dataset in section 8. Finally, the concluding remarks are provided
in section 8.
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2. A Review of Membership-Mappings Based Conditionally Deep Autoencoders
This section provides the review of membership-mappings and conditionally deep autoencoders from [10].
2.1. Notations
• Let n,N, p,M ∈ N.
• Let B(RN) denote the Borel σ−algebra on RN , and let λN denote the Lebesgue measure on B(RN ).
• Let (X ,A, ρ) be a probability space with unknown probability measure ρ.
• Let us denote by S the set of finite samples of data points drawn i.i.d. from ρ, i.e.,
S := {(xi ∼ ρ)Ni=1 | N ∈ N}. (1)
• F(X ) denotes the set of A-B(R) measurable functions f : X → R, i.e.,
F(X ) := {f : X → R | f is A-B(R) measurable}. (2)
• For a sequence x = (x1, · · · , xN ) ∈ S, let |x| denote the cardinality i.e. |x| = N .
• If x = (x1, · · · , xN ), a = (a1, · · · , aM ) ∈ S, then x ∧ a denotes the concatenation of the sequences x
and a, i.e., x ∧ a = (x1, . . . , xN , a1, . . . , aM ).
• Let ζx : R
|x| → [0, 1] be a membership function satisfying the following properties:
Nowhere Vanishing: ζx(y) > 0 for all y ∈ R|x|, i.e.,
supp[ζx] = R
|x|. (3)
Positive and Bounded Integrals: the functions ζx are absolutely continuous and Lebesgue inte-






Consistency of Induced Probability Measure: the membership function induced probability mea-










are consistent in the sense that for all x, a ∈ S:
Pζx∧a(A× R
|a|) = Pζx(A). (6)
• Denote a collection of membership functions as
Θ := {ζx : R
|x| → [0, 1] | (3), (4), (6), x ∈ S}. (7)
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2.2. Student-t Membership-Mapping
Definition 1 (Student-t Membership-Mapping [10]). A Student-t membership-mapping, F ∈ F(X ),
is a mapping with input space X = Rn and a membership function ζx ∈ Θ that is Student-t like:
ζx(y) =
(





where x ∈ S, y ∈ R|x|, ν ∈ R+ \ [0, 2] is the degrees of freedom, my ∈ R|x| is the mean vector, and
Kxx ∈ R|x|×|x| is the covariance matrix with its (i, j)−th element given as
(Kxx)i,j = kr(x
i, xj) (9)
where kr : Rn × Rn → R is a positive definite kernel function defined as











where xik is the k−th element of x
i, σ2 is the variance parameter, and w = (w1, · · · , wn) with wk ≥ 0.
2.3. Interpolation by Student-t Membership-Mapping
Let F ∈ F(Rn) be a zero-mean Student-t membership-mapping. Let x = {xi ∈ Rn | i ∈ {1, · · · , N}}
be a given set of input points and the corresponding mapping outputs are represented by the vector f :=
(F(x1), · · · ,F(xN )). Let a = {am | am ∈ Rn, m ∈ {1, · · · ,M}} be the set of auxiliary inducing points
and the mapping outputs corresponding to auxiliary inducing inputs, are represented by the vector u :=
(F(a1), · · · ,F(aM )). It follows from [10] that f, based upon the interpolation on elements of u, could be
represented by means of a membership function, µf;u : R



















K̄xx = Kxx −Kxa(Kaa)
−1KTxa. (13)





where kr : Rn × Rn → R is a positive definite kernel function defined as in (10).
The pair (RN , µf;u) constitutes a fuzzy set and µf;u(̃f) is interpreted as the degree to which f̃ matches an
attribute induced by f for a given u.
2.4. Variational Learning of a Membership-Mappings Based Model
2.4.1. A Modeling Scenario
Given a dataset {(xi, yi) | xi ∈ Rn, yi ∈ Rp, i ∈ {1, · · · , N}}, it is assumed that there exist zero-mean









2.4.2. An Algorithm for Variational Learning of Membership-Mappings
Given the training data samples {(xi, yi) | i ∈ {1, · · · , N}}, an analytical solution has been derived in [10]
for membership-mappings’ learning under modeling scenario (16). Algorithm 1 outlines the various steps
involved in the learning. With reference to Algorithm 1,
• yj , for j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , p}, is defined as
yj :=
[





where yij denotes the j−th element of y
i.
• ξ is given as
ξ = Nσ2. (18)





















where amk and x
i
k denotes the k−th element of a
m and xi respectively.



































• The quantities (âτ , b̂τ , âz, b̂z, âr, b̂r, âs, b̂s) follow
âτ = aτ + 0.5Np (21)














âr = ar (25)









âs = as + (âr/b̂r) (27)
b̂s = bs + (âr/b̂r)(âz/b̂z) (28)
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Algorithm 1 Variational learning of the membership-mappings [10]
Require: Dataset
{
(xi, yi) | xi ∈ Rn, yi ∈ Rp, i ∈ {1, · · · , N}
}
; number of auxiliary points M ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}; the degrees of
freedom associated to the Student-t membership-mapping ν ∈ R+ \ [0, 2].
1: Choose free parameters as σ2 = 1 and σ2x = 0.01.
2: The auxiliary inducing points are suggested to be chosen as the cluster centroids:
a = {am}Mm=1 = cluster centroid({x
i}Ni=1,M)
where cluster centroid({xi}Ni=1,M) represents the k-means clustering on {x
i}Ni=1.
3: Define w = (w1, w2, · · · , wn) such that wk (for k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}) is equal to the inverse of squared-distance between two
most-distant points in the set: {x1k, x
2
k, · · · , x
N
k }.
4: Compute Kaa, ξ, Ψ, and Φ using (14), (18), (19), and (20) respectively.
5: Choose aτ = bτ = ar = br = as = bs = 1.
6: Initialise âτ = b̂τ = âz = b̂z = âr = b̂r = 1.
7: Initialize âs and b̂s using (27) and (28).
8: repeat
9: Update E(m̂uj (yj)) as










(Ψ)T yj . (29)





















)T ξ − Tr((Kaa)−1Φ)





11: Update âτ , b̂τ (E(O)), âz , b̂z(E(O)), âr , b̂r , âs, b̂s using (21), (22), (23), (24), (25), (26), (27), (28) respectively.
12: Estimate β as
β = (âτ /b̂τ )(âz/b̂z). (31)
13: until (β nearly converges)




























15: return The parameters set M = {α,w, a, σ2, σ2x, B}.
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2.4.3. Prediction by Membership-Mappings
Given the parameters set M = {α,w, a, σ2, σ2x, B} returned by Algorithm 1, it follows from [10] that the
learned membership-mappings could be used to predict output corresponding to any arbitrary input data
point x∗ ∈ Rn as
ŷ(x∗;M) = αT (G(x∗;M))T . (34)
Here, G ∈ R1×M is a vector-valued function defined as


















, m ∈ {1, · · · ,M}, (36)
where amk and xk are the k−th elements of x and a





where (B)m,i denotes the (m, i)−th element of B. Now, the prediction equation (34) could alternatively be
expressed as
ŷ(x∗;M) = h1(x∗;M)y1 + · · ·+ hN (x∗;M)yN . (38)
2.5. A Bregman Divergence Based Conditionally Deep Autoencoder
Definition 2 (Membership-Mapping Autoencoder [10]). A membership-mapping autoencoder, G : Rp →
Rp, maps an input vector y ∈ Rp to G(y) ∈ Rp such that
G(y)
def
= [F1(Py) · · · Fp(Py) ]
T
, (39)
where Fj (j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , p}) is a Student-t membership-mapping, P ∈ Rn×p(n ≤ p) is a matrix such that the
product Py is a lower-dimensional encoding for y. That is, membership-mapping autoencoder first projects
the input vector onto a lower dimensional subspace and then constructs the output vector through Student-t
membership-mappings.
Definition 3 (Bregman divergence). The Bregman divergence BF , associated to a strictly convex twice
differentiable function F : Rp → R, is defined for any two vectors y ∈ Rp and ŷ ∈ Rp as
BF (ŷ, y) := F (ŷ)− F (y)− (ŷ − y)
T∇F (y) (40)
where ∇F denotes the gradient of F . Different choices of F leads to different forms of Bregman divergences.
We are in-particularly interested in the following two forms:
Bregman divergence associated to squared Euclidean norm: If we define F (y) = (1/2)‖y‖2, then




‖ŷ − y‖2. (41)
Relative entropy: For a vector y = [ y1 · · · yp ]T (with yj > 0 for all j ∈ {1, · · · , p}), if we define
F (y) =
∑p













Definition 4 (Conditionally Deep Autoencoder (CDA) [10]). A conditionally deep autoencoder, D :
Rp → Rp, maps a vector y ∈ Rp to D(y) ∈ Rp through a nested composition of finite number of membership-










l ∈ {1,··· ,L}
BsE(ŷ
l, y), choice 1
arg min














where Gl(·) is a membership-mapping autoencoder (Definition 2); ŷl is the output of l−th layer representing
input vector y at certain abstraction level such that ŷ1 is least abstract representation and ŷL is most abstract
representation of the input vector; and the autoencoder output D(y) is equal to the output of the layer re-
constructing the given input vector as good as possible where re-construction error is measured in-terms of
Bregman divergence. The Bregman divergence could be chosen either of squared Euclidean norm form or of






lŷl−1) · · · F lp(P
lŷl−1)
]T
where ŷ0 = y, P l ∈ Rnl×p is a matrix with nl ∈ {1, · · · , p} such that n1 ≥ n2 ≥ · · · ≥ nL, and F lj(·) is a
Student-t membership-mapping.
2.5.1. Variational Learning Algorithm
Given a set of N samples {y1, · · · , yN}, Algorithm 2 is suggested for the variational learning of CDA.
Algorithm 2 Variational learning of conditionally deep autoencoder [10]
Require: Data set Y =
{
yi ∈ Rp | i ∈ {1, · · · , N}
}
; the subspace dimension n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , p}; number of auxiliary points
M ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}; the number of layers L ∈ Z+.
1: Choose free parameters as ν1 = 2.1, ν2 = ∞, · · · , νL = ∞.
2: for l = 1 to L do
3: Set subspace dimension associated to l−th layer as nl = max(n− l+ 1, 1).
4: Define P l ∈ Rnl×p such that i−th row of P l is equal to transpose of eigenvector corresponding to i−th largest eigenvalue
of sample covariance matrix of data set Y.
5: Define a latent variable xl,i ∈ Rnl , for i ∈ {1, · · · , N}, as
xl,i =
{
P lyi if l = 1,
P lŷl−1(xl−1,i;Ml−1) if l > 1
(46)
where ŷl−1 is the estimated output of the (l − 1)−th layer computed for the parameters set Ml−1 =
{αl−1, wl−1, al−1, σ2, σ2x, B
l−1}.
6: Compute parameters set Ml characterizing the membership-mappings associated to l−th layer by applying Algorithm 1
on data set
{
(xl,i, yi) | i ∈ {1, · · · , N}
}
with number of auxiliary points M and degrees of freedom as νl.
7: end for
8: return The parameters set M = {{M1, · · · ,ML}, {P 1, · · · , PL}}.
Definition 5 (Filtering by CDA [10]). Given a CDA with its parameters being represented by a set M =




P ly, l = 1
P lŷl−1(xl−1;Ml−1) l ≥ 2
(47)











































where ŷlj denotes the j−th element of ŷ
l and ŷl is computed using (34) or equivalently (38). CDA’s output
















where hi is defined by (37).
2.5.2. A Wide Conditionally Deep Autoencoder
For a big dataset i.e. N is large, a wide conditionally deep autoencoder is defined as in Definition 6.
Definition 6 (A Wide CDA [10]). A wide CDA, WD : Rp → Rp, maps a vector y ∈ Rp to WD(y) ∈ Rp
through a parallel composition of S (S ∈ Z+) number of CDAs such that













s)], exp[y]) , choice 2
(52)
Here, D(y;Ms) denotes the output of s−th CDA (that was characterized by parameters set Ms) and exp[·]
denotes the element-wise exponential.
Algorithm 3 is suggested for the variational learning of wide CDA.
Algorithm 3 Variational learning of wide CDA [10]
Require: Data set Y =
{
yi ∈ Rp | i ∈ {1, · · · , N}
}
; the subspace dimension n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , p}; ratio M/N ∈ (0, 1]; the number
of layers L ∈ Z+.
1: Apply k-means clustering to partition Y into S subsets, {Y1, · · · ,YS}, where S = ⌈N/1000⌉.
2: for s = 1 to S do
3: Build a CDA, Ms, by applying Algorithm 2 on Ys taking n as the subspace dimension; the number of auxiliary points
as equal to (M/N) ×#Ys (where #Ys is the number of data points in Ys); and L as the number of layers.
4: end for
5: return the set of parameters sets: P = {Ms}Ss=1.
2.6. Classification Applications
Definition 7 (A Classifier [10]). A classifier, C : Rp → {1, 2, · · · , C}, maps a vector y ∈ Rp to C(y) ∈








c ∈ {1,··· ,C}
BsE(WD(y;Pc), y), choice 1
arg min
c ∈ {1,··· ,C}
Bre (exp[WD(y;Pc)], exp[y]) , choice 2
(53)
where WD(y;Pc), computed using (51), is the output of c−th wide CDA (that was characterized by param-
eters set Pc) and exp[·] denotes the element-wise exponential. The classifier assigns to an input vector the
label of that class whose associated autoencoder best reconstructs the input vector where re-construction error
is measured in-terms of Bregman divergence.
Algorithm 4 is provided for the learning of the classifier.
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Algorithm 4 Variational learning of the classifier [10]
Require: Labeled data set Y =
{
Yc | Yc =
{
yi,c ∈ Rp | i ∈ {1, · · · , Nc}
}
, c ∈ {1, · · · , C}
}
; the subspace dimension n ∈
{1, · · · , p}; ratio M/N ∈ (0, 1]; the number of layers L ∈ Z+.
1: for c = 1 to C do
2: Build a wide CDA, Pc = {Msc}
Sc
s=1, by applying Algorithm 3 on Yc for given n, M/N , and L.
3: end for
4: return the set of parameters sets {Pc}Cc=1.
3. A Review of Privacy-Preserving Semi-Supervised Transfer Learning
This section reviews the method suggested in [7] for privacy-preserving semi-supervised transfer learning.
The method of [7], with an adaptation to the current formulation of Bregman divergence based conditionally
deep autoencoder, is described in the following:
Optimal noise adding mechanism for differentially private classifiers:. The approach suggested in [7] relies
on a tailored noise adding mechanism to achieve a given level of differential privacy-loss bound with the
minimum perturbation of the data. In particularly, Algorithm 5 is suggested for a differentially private
approximation of data samples and Algorithm 6 is suggested for building a differentially private classifier.
Algorithm 5 Differentially private approximation of data samples [7]
Require: Data set Y =
{
yi ∈ Rp | i ∈ {1, · · · , N}
}
; differential privacy parameters: d ∈ R+, ǫ ∈ R+, δ ∈ (0, 1).







(tij ; ǫ, δ, d), t
i
j ∈ (0, 1) (54)
where y+ij is j−th element of y

































, tij ∈ (0, 1). (55)
2: return Y+ =
{
y+i ∈ Rp | i ∈ {1, · · · , N}
}
.
Algorithm 6 Variational learning of a differentially private classifier [7]




c | c ∈ {1, · · · , C}
}
; the subspace dimension n ∈ {1, · · · , p};
ratio M/N ∈ (0, 1]; the number of layers L ∈ Z+.
1: Run Algorithm 4 on Y+ to build a classifier characterized by parameters sets {P+c }
C
c=1.
2: return {P+c }
C
c=1.
Semi-supervised learning scenario:. The aim is to transfer the knowledge extracted by a classifier trained
using source dataset to the classifier of target domain such that privacy of source dataset is preserved.
Let {Ysrc }
C





psr | i ∈ {1, · · · , Nsrc }} represents












ptg | i ∈ {1, · · · , N tg∗ }}.
Differentially private source domain classifier:. For a given differential privacy parameters: d, ǫ, δ; Algo-









c=1 to build a differentially




Differentially private source domain latent subspace transformation-matrix:. For a lower-dimensional repre-
sentation of both source and target samples, a subspace dimension, nst ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,min(psr, ptg)}, is chosen.
Let V +sr ∈ Rnst×psr be the transformation-matrix with its i−th row equal to transpose of eigenvector
corresponding to i−th largest eigenvalue of sample covariance matrix computed on {Y+src }
C
c=1.
Differentially private class-centers in latent subspace of source domain:. Let m̄+src ∈ R
nst be the center of
the c−th labelled noise added source data samples in latent subspace defined as
m̄+src = median
({





Target domain latent subspace transformation-matrix:. Let V tg ∈ Rnst×ptg be the transformation-matrix
with its i−th row equal to transpose of eigenvector corresponding to i−th largest eigenvalue of sample




∗ . For the case of homogeneous source and target domains
(i.e. psr = ptg), one could choose V
tg as equal to V +sr.
Class-centers in latent subspace of target domain:. For a given classifier function, ĉ : Rtg → {1, 2, · · · , C},
let m̄tgc ∈ R
nst be a vector defined as
m̄tgc = median
({






V tgyi,∗tg | ĉ(y
i,∗





A transformation for representing target data samples in source-data-space:. To represent a target sample
in source-data-space, subspace alignment approach is followed. For a given set, θ = {m̄tgc , V
tg, m̄+src , V
+sr},
a transformation, f tg→src : R
ptg → Rpsr , is defined as
f tg→src (y
i,∗
tg ; θ = {m̄
tg
c , V
tg, m̄+src , V
+sr}) := (V +sr)T
(







That is, f tg→src maps a target sample close to center of c−th labelled target data samples to a point in
source-data-space that is close to center of c−th labelled source data samples.
A combination of source and target domain classifiers:. The label associated to yi,∗tg is predicted via com-
































































That is, yi,∗tg is assigned the c−th class label, if
• either the wide-deep autoencoder associated to c−th class of target data space (which is characterized
by set of parameters Ptgc ) could best reconstruct y
i,∗
tg , or
• the differentially private wide-deep autoencoder associated to c−th class of source data space (which is




tg ; θ) (which is corresponding
to yi,∗tg the transformed point in source data space close to the center of c−th labelled source data
samples),
where the re-construction error is measured in-terms of Bregman divergence.
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m̄tgc |k = median
({





















where n|k and M/N |k are parameters of Algorithm 4 in k−th iteration such that {n|1, n|2, · · · } and
{(M/N)|1, (M/N)|2, · · · } are monotonically non-decreasing sequences. The reason for subspace dimension
n and M/N ratio to follow a monotonically non-decreasing curve during the iterations is to use higher-level
data features during initial iterations for updating the predicted-labels of unlabeled target data samples and
as the number of iterations increases more and more lower-level data features are intended to be included
in the process of updating the predicted-labels.
Algorithm 7 has been suggested for a practical implementation of the method.
4. Conditionally Deep Autoencoders for Inverse Problems
Given a CDA M trained with dataset
{
yi ∈ Rp | i ∈ {1, · · · , N}
}
using Algorithm 2, the CDA could be
applied for solving the inverse problem related to y = ft→y(t), where ft→y : R
q → Rp is a forward map. It












Following the approach of [16], the deep autoencoder allows estimating t (where y = ft→y(t)) from y simply
via replacing yi by ti (where yi = ft→y(t

























where tik is k−th element of t


































to express (73) as
t̂k(y;M, {t
i}Ni=1) = (g(y;M))mk. (76)
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Algorithm 7 Differentially private semi-supervised transfer learning [7]
Require: A differentially private source domain classifier characterized by parameters sets {P+src }
C
c=1; a differentially pri-
vate source domain latent subspace transformation-matrix: V +sr ∈ Rnst×psr ; the differentially private class-centers in
latent subspace of source domain: {m̄+src ∈ R










ptg | i ∈ {1, · · · , Ntgc }} is the set of c−th labelled target samples); the set of unlabelled tar-
get samples: Ytg∗ = {y
i,∗
tg ∈ R
ptg | i ∈ {1, · · · , Ntg∗ }}; a target domain initial classifier built using labelled target
data samples and characterized by parameters sets: {Ptgc |0}
C
c=1; the number of iterations: Nit; a monotonically non-
decreasing subspace dimension sequence: {n|1, n|2, · · · , n|Nit}; a monotonically non-decreasing M/N ratio sequence:
{(M/N)|1, (M/N)|2, · · · , (M/N)|Nit}; the number of layers in the deep model associated to target domain classifier: L.
1: Use initial target classifier (i.e. {Ptgc |0}
C
c=1) to predict class-labels of unlabelled target data samples and partition the total
unlabelled samples into C different subsets such that each subset consists of samples with same predicted class label. That
















where C(·) is defined by (53).
2: Define the target domain latent subspace transformation-matrix: V tg ∈ Rnst×ptg such that i−th row of V tg is equal to





In the special case of psr = ptg, V tg could be defined as V tg = V +sr.
3: Initialize the center of the c−th labelled target data samples in latent subspace as
m̄tgc |0 = median
({

















where C(·) is defined by (53).
4: for k = 1 to Nit do
5: Set L|k = L, if k = Nit, otherwise set L|k = 1.
6: Update the target domain classifier as
{Ptgc |k}
C







, n|k, (M/N)|k , L|k
)
. (66)

























where ĉ(·) is defined by (59).
8: Update the center of the c−th labelled target data samples in latent subspace as
m̄tgc |k = median
({





















where ĉ(·) is defined by (59).
9: end for








4.1. A Prior Inverse Model
Expression (76) allows to estimate for any arbitrary y the corresponding t using CDA. This motivates
introducing the following prior inverse model:
tk = (g(y;M)) θk + ek (77)
θk ∼ N (mk,Λ
−1
k ) (78)
ek ∼ N (0, γ
−1) (79)
γ ∼ Gamma(aγ , bγ) (80)
where k ∈ {1, · · · , q}; N (mk,Λ
−1
k ) is the multivariate normal distribution with mean mk and covariance
Λ−1k ; and Gamma(aγ , bγ) is the Gamma distribution with shape parameter aγ and rate parameter bγ . The
estimation provided by CDA (i.e. (76)) is incorporated by the prior model (77-80), since
E[tk] = t̂k(y;M, {t
i}Ni=1). (81)
4.2. Variational Bayesian Inference of Inverse Model
Given the dataset, {(yi ∈ Rp, ti ∈ Rq) | i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}}, the variational Bayesian method is considered
for an inference of the stochastic model (77), with priors as (78), (79), and (80). For all i ∈ {1, · · · , N} and








where θk ∼ N (mk,Λ
−1
k ) and e
i
k ∼ N (0, γ
−1). Define tk ∈ RN , ek ∈ RN , and Ry ∈ RN×M as
tk =
[





















For all k ∈ {1, · · · , q}, we have























Define the following sets:
t := {t1, · · · , tq} (90)
θ := {θ1, · · · , θq} (91)
and consider the marginal probability of data t which is given as
p(t) =
∫
dθ dγ p(t, θ, γ). (92)
Let q(θ, γ) be an arbitrary distribution. The log marginal probability of t can be expressed as
log(p(t)) =
∫
dθ dγ q(θ, γ) log(p(t)) (93)
=
∫















L(q(θ, γ), t) :=
∫
dθ dγ q(θ, γ) log (p(t, θ, γ)/q(θ, γ)) (95)
to express (94) as
log(p(t)) = L(q(θ, γ), t) + KL(q(θ, γ)‖p(θ, γ|t)) (96)
where KL is the Kullback-Leibler divergence of p(θ, γ|t) from q(θ, γ) and L, referred to as negative free
energy, provides a lower bound on the the logarithmic evidence for the data.
The variational Bayesian approach minimizes the difference (in term of KL divergence) between varia-
tional and true posteriors via analytically maximizing negative free energy L over variational distributions.
However, the analytical derivation requires the following widely used mean-field approximation:
q(θ, γ) = q(θ)q(γ) (97)
= q(θ1) · · · q(θq)q(γ). (98)
Applying the standard variational optimization technique (as in [13, 15, 14, 11, 9, 12, 8]), it can be verified
















where the parameters (Λ̂k, m̂k, âγ , b̂γ) satisfy the following:

















âγ = aγ + 0.5qN (103)












Algorithm 8 is suggested for variational Bayesian inference of the inverse model. The optimal distributions
Algorithm 8 Variational Bayesian inference of the inverse model
Require: Dataset
{
(yi ∈ Rp, ti ∈ Rq) | yi = ft→y(ti), i ∈ {1, · · · , N}
}
and a CDA, M, trained with dataset {yi ∈ Rp | i ∈
{1, · · · , N}}.
1: For all k ∈ {1, · · · , q}, compute mk using (74) taking l = 1 (i.e. first layer of DSFMA).
2: For all k ∈ {1, · · · , q}, choose Λk = 10
−6IM .
3: Choose aγ = 10−6 and bγ = 10−6.
4: Initialise âγ/b̂γ = 1.
5: repeat
6: Update {Λ̂k , m̂k | k ∈ {1, · · · , q}}, âγ , b̂γ using (101), (102), (103), (104).
7: until (convergence or iterations = 1000)
8: return IM = {{m̂k, Λ̂k | k ∈ {1, · · · , q}}, âγ , b̂γ}.
determined using Algorithm 8 define the so-called Variational Bayesian Inverse Model (VBIM) as stated in
Remark 1.
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Remark 1 (Variational Bayesian Inverse Model (VBIM)). The inverse mapping, f−1t→y, is approxi-
mated as
tk = (g(y;M)) θk + ek, (105)
θk ∼ N (m̂k, Λ̂
−1
k ) (106)
ek ∼ N (0, γ
−1) (107)
γ ∼ Gamma(âγ , b̂γ) (108)
where k ∈ {1, · · · , q}, xl is defined by (47), l∗ is given by (49), G is defined by (35), and (m̂k, Λ̂k, âγ , b̂γ) are
returned by Algorithm 8.
Remark 2 (Estimation by VBIM). Given any y∗, the inverse model IM (returned by Algorithm 8) can










∗;M, IM) = (g(y∗;M)) m̂k, ∀k ∈ {1, · · · , q}. (110)
5. Information-Leakage
Consider a scenario that y = ft→y(t). The mutual information I(t; y) measures the amount of information
obtained about variable t through observing variable y. Given a scenario that y = ft→y(t), the entropy H(t)
remains fixed independent of mapping ft→y and thus the quantity I(t; y)−H(t) is a measure of the amount
of information about t leaked by the mapping ft→y. We define a measure of the amount of information
about t leaked by the mapping ft→y as
ILft→y := I(t; ft→y(t))−H(t) (111)
= I(t; y)−H(t). (112)
The quantity ILft→y is referred to as information-leakage. This section is dedicated to answer the ques-
tion: How to calculate without knowing data distributions the information-leakage? Fig. 2 outlines a novel
approach to the estimation of information-leakage. The approach consists of following steps:
1. A conditionally deep autoencoder (CDA), representing data features, induces a variational Bayesian
inverse model (for approximating f−1t→y), as explained in section 4.
2. It will be stated in subsection 5.1 that the inverse model facilitates deriving an analytical approximation
of the mutual information between the two variables using variational optimization.
3. The analytical expression for mutual information and the available data samples can be used to
compute information-leakage via an algorithm provided in subsection 5.2.
5.1. Variational Approximation of Mutual Information
There may be an interest in estimating the mutual information between a random variable t (t ∈ Rq) and
another random variable y (y ∈ Rp), where the data distribution p(t, y) is unknown. The mutual information
between t and y is given as
I(t; y) = H(t)−H(t|y) (113)
= H(t) +
∫
p(t, y) log (p(t|y)) dt dy (114)
= H(t) + 〈log (p(t|y))〉p(t,y) (115)
where 〈g(y)〉p(y) denotes the expectation of a function of random variable g(y) w.r.t. probability density
function p(y); H(t) and H(t|y) are marginal and conditional entropies respectively. Consider the conditional
probability of t which is given as
p(t|y) =
∫















Figure 2: Information-leakage by a mapping ft→y , i.e. ILft→y , is evaluated via a variational approximation method based on
a CDA (M) induced inverse model IM.
where θ is a set defined as in (91). Let q(θ, γ) be an arbitrary distribution. The log conditional probability
of t can be expressed as
log(p(t|y)) =
∫
dθ dγ q(θ, γ) log (p(t|y)) (117)
=
∫








dθ dγ q(θ, γ) log (p(θ, γ, t|y)/q(θ, γ)) +
∫







L(q(θ, γ), t, y) :=
∫






to express (119) as
log(p(t|y)) = L(q(θ, γ), t, y) + KL(q(θ, γ)‖p(θ, γ|t, y)) (121)
where KL is Kullback-Leibler divergence of p(θ, γ|t, y) from q(θ, γ). Using (115),
I(t; y) = H(t) + 〈L(q(θ, γ), t, y)〉p(t,y) + 〈KL(q(θ, γ)‖p(θ, γ|t, y))〉p(t,y) . (122)
Since Kullback-Leibler divergence is always non-zero, it follows from (122) that H(t) + 〈L〉p(t,y) provides a
lower bound on I(t; y) i.e.
I(t; y) ≥ H(t) + 〈L(q(θ, γ), t, y)〉p(t,y) . (123)
Our approach to approximate I(t; y) is to maximize its lower bound with respect to variational distribution
q(θ, γ). That is, we solve
Î(t; y) = max
q(θ,γ)
(
H(t) + 〈L(q(θ, γ), t, y)〉p(t,y)
)
(124)
= H(t) + max
q(θ,γ)
〈L(q(θ, γ), t, y)〉p(t,y) . (125)
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Result 1 (Variational Approximation of I(t; y)). Given the model (105)-(108), Î(t; y) is given as























































Here, ̥(·) is the digamma function and the parameters (Λ̄k, m̄k, āγ , b̄γ) satisfy the following:




















āγ = âγ + 0.5q (129)
























L(q(θ, γ), t, y) = 〈log(p(t|θ, γ, y))〉q(θ,γ) + 〈log (p(θ, γ)/q(θ, γ))〉q(θ,γ) . (131)
It follows from (105) and (107) that
log(p(tk|y, θk, γ)) = −0.5 log(2π) + 0.5 log(γ)− 0.5γ|tk − (g(y;M))θk|
2.
Since t = [ t1 · · · tq ]
T , we have





Using (132) and (97-98) in (131), we have


































































































Now, 〈L(q(θ, γ), t, y)〉p(t,y) can be maximized w.r.t. q(θk) and q(γ) using variational optimization. It can be



















































∗(γ)‖p(γ; âγ , b̂γ))
where ̥(·) is the digamma function. After substituting the maximum value in (125) and calculating
Kullback-Leibler divergences, we get (126).
5.2. Variational Approximation of Information-Leakage
The information theoretic measure ILft→y could be estimated using available data samples based on Re-
sult 1. Algorithm 9 is stated for the variational approximation of the information-leakage. The information-
leakage returned by Algorithm 9 has been denoted as ÎL
M
ft→y
to emphasize that the information-leakage by
the mapping ft→y is estimated by means of a CDA M.
Algorithm 9 Estimation of information-leakage, ILft→y = I(t; y)−H(t), using variational approximation
Require: Dataset
{
(yi ∈ Rp, ti ∈ Rq) | yi = ft→y(ti), i ∈ {1, · · · , N}
}
and a CDA, M, trained with dataset {yi ∈ Rp | i ∈
{1, · · · , N}}.
1: Apply Algorithm 8 to obtain an inverse model IM = {{m̂k , Λ̂k | k ∈ {1, · · · , q}}, âγ , b̂γ}.
2: Initialise ā/b̄ = â/b̂.
3: repeat
4: Update {Λ̄k, m̄k | k ∈ {1, · · · , q}}, ā, b̄ using (127)-(130) where expectations < · >p(x) and < · >p(t,x) are approximated
via sample-averages.
5: until (convergence or iterations = 1000)









5.3. Verification of Information-Leakage Estimation Algorithm
To demonstrate the effectiveness of Algorithm 9 for estimating information-leakage, a scenario is gen-
erated where t ∈ R10 is Gaussian distributed such that t ∼ N (0, 5I10), y = t + ω, ω ∼ N (0, σI10), and
σ ∈ [0.01, 5]. Since the data distributions in this scenario are known, the information-leakage can be theo-
retically calculated and is given as
ILft→y = 5 log(1 + 5/σ)− 0.5 log (|(2πe5I10)|) .
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For a given value of σ ∈ [0.01, 5], 1000 samples of t and y were simulated. A CDA was obtained using
Algorithm 2 taking n = 10, M = 500, and L = 1. The CDA was then used in Algorithm 9 for estimating
information-leakage. The experiments were carried out at different values of σ ranging from 0.01 to 5.
Fig. 3 compares the plots of estimated and theoretically calculated values of information-leakage against σ.










Figure 3: A comparison of the estimated information-leakage values with the theoretically calculated values.
A close agreement between the two plots in Fig. 3 verifies the effectiveness of Algorithm 9 in estimating
information-leakage without knowing the data distributions.
6. Measures for Privacy-Leakage, Interpretability, and Transferability
This section defines information theoretic measures for privacy-leakage, interpretability, and transfer-
ability. For this, a few variables and mappings are introduced in Table 2.
Definition 8 (Privacy-Leakage). Privacy-leakage (by the mapping from private variables to noise added
feature vector) is a measure of the amount of information about private/sensitive variable xsr leaked by the

















Definition 9 (Interpretability-Measure). Interpretability (of noise added feature vector) is measured as



















Table 2: Introduced variables and mappings.
symbol/mapping definition/meaning
xsr ∈ Rnsr
vector representing private/sensitive variables
associated to source domain
ysr ∈ Rpsr source domain feature vector
tsr ∈ Rq
vector representing the set of interpretable parameters
associated to non-interpretable feature vector ysr
y+sr ∈ R
psr
noise added feature vector (whose samples
serve as training data for the learning of source model)
obtained from ysr via Algorithm 5
fxsr→y+sr : R
nsr → Rpsr
mapping from private variables to




mapping from interpretable parameters
to non-interpretable noise added feature vector,




differentially private source domain autoencoders,
representing data features of each of C classes,
obtained via Algorithm 6
ytg ∈ Rptg target domain feature vector
Ltg : Rptg → {1, · · · , C}
mapping assigning ground-truth label to
a target domain feature vector such that






: Rptg → Rpsr
transformation of ytg to source domain and filtering
through the autoencoder (that represents the source













where f tg→src (with c = Ltg(ytg)) is defined by (58) and
WD represents the wide CDA (i.e. Definition 6)
Definition 10 (Transferability-Measure). Transferability (from differentially private source domain data-
representation models (i.e. P+sr1 , · · · ,P
+sr
C ) to the target domain) is measured as the amount of information






























transforms a target domain feature vector ytg to the source domain followed by
the filtering through the autoencoder (that represents the source domain feature vectors of the same class as













where Ltg(ytg) ∈ {1, · · · , C}, f tg→src is defined by (58), and WD represents the wide CDA (i.e. Definition 6)
characterized by P+srLtg(ytg).
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Definitions 8, 9, and 10 provide information theoretic measures for privacy-leakage, interpretability, and
transferability. Since these measures are in the form of information-leakages, these measures can be calcu-
lated using Algorithm 9.
7. A Demonstrative Study
For demonstrating the application of the proposed measures (for privacy-leakage, interpretability, and
transferability) to study the tradeoffs between TAI principles, experiments were made on the widely used
MNIST digits dataset. The privacy-preserving interpretable and transferable learning method was imple-
mented using MATLAB R2017b on a MacBook Pro machine with a 2.2 GHz Intel Core i7 processor and 16
GB of memory.
7.1. Data Preprocessing
The MNIST dataset contains 28× 28 sized images divided into training set of 60000 images and testing
set of 10000 images. The images’ pixel values were divided by 255 to normalize the values in the range from
0 to 1. The 28× 28 normalized pixel values of each image were flattened to an equivalent 784−dimensional
data feature vector.
7.2. Interpretable Parameters
For MNIST digits dataset, there exist no additional interpretable parameters and thus we defined corre-
sponding to a data feature vector y ∈ R784, an interpretable parameter vector t ∈ {0, 1}10 such that j−th
element tj = 1, if j−th class-label is associated to y, otherwise tj = 0. That is, interpretable vector t, in
our experimental setting, represents the class-label assigned to data feature vector y.
7.3. Private Data
It was assumed that normalized pixel values are private, i.e., the vector representing private variables is
equal to 784−dimensional data feature vector.
7.4. Semi-Supervised Transfer Learning Scenario
A transfer learning scenario was considered in the same setting as in [20, 7] where 60000 training samples
constituted the source dataset; a set of 9000 test samples constituted target dataset, and the classification
performance was evaluated on the remaining 1000 test samples. Out of 9000 target samples, only 10 samples
per class were labelled and rest 8900 target samples remained as unlabelled.
7.5. Source Domain Noise Adding Mechanism Settings
Algorithm 5 is applied with d = 1 to obtain the differentially private approximations of source dataset at
different values of privacy-loss bound ǫ ∈ {0.1, 1, 2, 8,∞} while keeping failure probability fixed at δ = 1e−5.
7.6. Transfer Learning Algorithm Settings
Following [7], the inputs required by Algorithm 7 are obtained as described below:
1. Differentially private source domain classifier is built using Algorithm 6 taking subspace dimension as
equal to min(20, psr) (where psr is the dimension of source data samples), ratio M/N as equal to 0.5,
and number of layers as equal to 5.
2. Differentially private source domain latent subspace transformation-matrix is computed with nst =
min(⌈psr/2⌉, ptg), where ptg is the dimension of target data samples.
3. Differentially private class-centers in latent subspace of source domain are computed using (56).
4. Initial target domain classifier is built using Algorithm 4 on labelled target samples taking subspace
dimension as equal to min(20,min1≤c≤C{N tgc } − 1) (where N
tg
c is the number of c− th class labelled
target samples), ratio M/N as equal to 1, and number of layers as equal to 1.
5. The number of iterations is set equal to 4; the monotonically non-decreasing subspace dimension








6. The number of layers in the deep model associated to target domain classifier is set as equal to 5.
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7.7. Information-Leakage Estimation Algorithm Settings
The CDA required by Algorithm 9 for calculating information-leakage is obtained using Algorithm 2
taking n = 20, M = ⌈N/10⌉, and L = 1.
7.8. Experimental Design
10 independent experiments were made where in each experiment, the test samples, target samples,
and target labelled samples were chosen randomly. Each of 10 experiments involves 5 different privacy-
preserving transfer learning scenarios with privacy-loss bound values as ǫ = ∞ (i.e. non-private), ǫ = 8,
ǫ = 2, ǫ = 1, and ǫ = 0.1. In each scenario, privacy-leakage (i.e. Definition 8) and interpretability-measure
(i.e. Definition 9) were calculated via applying Algorithm 9 on 100 per class randomly chosen source domain
samples while transferability-measure (i.e. Definition 10) was calculated via applying Algorithm 9 on labelled
target samples. Further, for each scenario, the results are obtained for both choices of Bregman divergence
(i.e. squared Euclidean norm and relative entropy).
7.9. Results
The averaged results over 10 independent experiments have been reported in Table 3 and plotted in
Fig. 4. Fig. 4(a), Fig. 4(b), and Fig. 4(c) display the privacy-accuracy tradeoff curve, privacy-interpretability
tradeoff curve, and privacy-transferability tradeoff curve respectively. As expected and observed in Fig. 4(f),
the transferability-measure is positively correlated with the classification accuracy on target test samples.
Since we have defined the interpretable vector associated to a feature vector as representing the class-label,
the positive correlations of interpretability-measure with the accuracy and the transferability-measure are
observed in Fig. 4(e) and Fig. 4(d) respectively.












433.8497 4.0714 136.1498 0.9852
415.4332 3.8345 134.2483 0.9829
228.7308 1.4717 121.1469 0.9662
38.8434 -1.1309 72.4297 0.9192




433.8497 4.0714 135.0105 0.9857
415.4332 3.8345 131.8903 0.9827
228.7308 1.4717 122.3949 0.9644
38.8434 -1.1309 76.5772 0.9181
-56.7136 -2.1589 26.7081 0.9040
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relative entropy type CDA
squared Euclidean norm type CDA
(a) privacy-leakage vs. accuracy
























relative entropy type CDA
squared Euclidean norm type CDA
(b) privacy-leakage vs. interpretability-measure





















relative entropy type CDA
squared Euclidean norm type CDA
(c) privacy-leakage vs. transferability-measure





















relative entropy type CDA
squared Euclidean norm type CDA
(d) interpretability-measure vs. transferability-measure














relative entropy type CDA
squared Euclidean norm type CDA
(e) interpretability-measure vs. accuracy














relative entropy type CDA
squared Euclidean norm type CDA
(f) transferability-measure vs. accuracy




Figure 5: An example of a source domain sample corresponding to different levels of privacy-leakage. While moving from left
to right in the figure, the privacy-leakage decreases as 435, 416.52, 232.79, 39.26, -59.08.
Figure 6: An example of a source domain sample corresponding to different levels of interpretability-measure. While moving
from left to right in the figure, the interpretability-measure decreases as 4.08, 3.99, 1.43, -1.09, -2.17.
Figure 7: An example of a target domain sample transformed, via (142), to the source domain corresponding to different
levels of transferability-measure. While moving from left to right in the figure, the transferability-measure decreases as 121.64,
117.43, 59.77, 47.45, -264.12.
Fig. 5 visualizes the level of noise to be added to the data feature samples for different values of privacy-
leakage. For a visualization of the interpretability-measure, the interpretable parameters associated to a
feature vector can be estimated by the inverse model (as stated in Remark 2). Since the interpretable
parameters represent in this case a class-label, the estimated interpretable vector t̃ ∈ R10 is transformed, for
a visualization, to the pixel-domain as t̃1ȳ
+1
sr +· · ·+ t̃10ȳ
+10
sr , where t̃c is c−th element of t̃ and ȳ
+c
sr is the mean
of all c−th labelled noise added source data samples. Fig. 6 visualizes the different levels of interpretability
via transforming estimated interpretable parameters to the pixel-domain. Finally, the different levels of




The paper has introduced an information theoretic trustworthy AI framework. The information theoretic
measures have been defined for privacy-leakage, interpretability, and transferability to study the inherent
tradeoffs between TAI principles. This is the first study to develop information theory based unified approach
to trustworthy AI. Although the text has not focused on federated and distributed learning, the transfer
learning approach could be easily extended to the multi-party system and the transferability-measure could
be calculated for any pair of parties. Also, the explainability of the conditionally deep autoencoders follows,
similar to as in [16], via estimating interpretable parameters from non-interpretable data feature vectors
using variational Bayesian inverse model (see, Remark 2). Further, the inverse model (stated in Remark 1)
quantifies uncertainties on the estimation of parameters (of interest) which is also important for a user’s trust
on the model. The proposed unified approach to privacy-preserving interpretable and transferable learn-
ing involves Bregman divergence based conditionally deep autoencoders, albeit other data representation
learning models could be explored under the proposed trustworthy AI framework.
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